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IN R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, the D.C. Court of Appeals
expounded on the constitutional limits placed on compelled speech in
a commercial setting.I Specifically, the court held that certain graphic
images required to be included on cigarette packages violated tobacco
companies' First Amendment rights.2 In its analysis, the majority used an
incorrect level of scrutiny and should have instead applied the less-exact-
ing Zauderer standard.3 This analysis would have required the court to
uphold the graphic images against the constitutional challenge.4
In 2009, Congress enacted the Family Smoking Prevention and To-
bacco Control Act (the Act) requiring, inter alia, cigarette packages to
bear certain textual and graphic warning labels "compris[ing] the top 50
percent of the front and rear panels of the package." 5 To implement this
requirement, the Act directed the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services to "issue regulations that require color graphics depict-
ing the negative health consequences of smoking" to be included on ciga-
rette packages.6 Pursuant to this direction, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) promulgated the final set of nine required images
in a 2011 regulation (the Rule).7
The FDA chose these nine images by evaluating the "effectiveness of
the proposed color graphic images and their accompanying textual warn-
* J.D. Candidate 2014, SMU Dedman School of Law; B.A. Economics 2010, The
University of Texas at Austin. The author would like to thank his wife, Rebecca, for her
continued love and support.
1. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA (R.J. Reynolds II), 696 F.3d 1205, 1211-13
(D.C. Cir. 2012).
2. Id. at 1222.
3. See id. at 1222-23 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 1223.
5. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 201,
123 Stat. 1776, 1842 (2009).
6. Id. at 1845.
7. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg.
36,628, 36,648-57 (June 22, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141).
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ing statements at conveying information about various health risks of
smoking, and additionally, at encouraging smoking cessation and discour-
aging smoking initiation."8 This evaluation process measured key out-
comes, including salience, recall, influence on beliefs, and behavioral
intentions.9
The graphic images chosen by the FDA include an image of a man
smoking "through a tracheotomy hole . . . , a pair of diseased lungs next
to a pair of healthy lungs. . . , [and] a bare-chested male cadaver lying on
a table"' 0 The FDA explained that the purpose of the warnings was to
"communicate effectively and graphically the very real, scientifically es-
tablished adverse health consequences of smoking.""
Five tobacco companies (the Companies) challenged the Rule, claiming
that the proposed graphic warnings violated the First Amendment.12 The
district court granted the Companies' motion for summary judgment,
finding that the Rule violated the First Amendment because it was not
"narrowly tailored to achieve a constitutionally permissible form of com-
pelled commercial speech," as required under strict scrutiny.' 3 The FDA
appealed this decision, arguing that the district court failed to use the
correct level of scrutiny and erroneously found the Rule
unconstitutional.14
The First Amendment prevents excessive government regulation of
"[b]oth the right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking."' 5 Al-
though both individual and commercial speech are protected by the First
Amendment, courts have afforded a lesser constitutional protection to
the latter, leading to two relevant exceptions to the general rule that con-
tent-based speech regulations are subject to a strict scrutiny review.16 The
first exception provides that if the challenged regulation requires a
"purely factual" disclosure by the company, as opposed to "'matters of
opinion," "an advertiser's rights are adequately protected so long as dis-
closure requirements are reasonably related to the state's interest in
preventing deception" or confusion and are not "unduly burdensome."' 7
8. Id. at 36,636.
9. Id. at 36,638. The FDA's evaluation process included a study where participants
were exposed to either one of the thirty-six proposed graphic images or one of the nine
textual warning statements. Id. The participants evaluated their reactions to the images or
texts immediately after the viewing and again one week after completing the survey. Id.
10. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. FDA (R.J. Reynolds 1), 845 F. Supp. 2d 266, 270
(D.D.C.), affd sub nom. R.J. Reynolds II, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
11. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. at
36641.
12. R.J. Reynolds 1, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 268.
13. Id. at 277.
14. R.J. Reynolds II, 696 F.3d at 1208, 1213.
15. Id. at 1211.
16. Id. at 1211-12. Both the majority and dissenting opinions in R.I. Reynolds II ap-
pear to assume that the speech in question was properly classified as commercial speech.
See id. at 1212, 1222.
17. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471
U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
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This Zauderer standard "is akin to rational-basis review."18 Under
Zauderer, "regulations aimed at false or misleading advertisements are
permissible only where 'the particular advertising is inherently likely to
deceive or where the record indicates that a particular form or method of
advertising has in fact been deceptive."' 19 If the restriction on commer-
cial speech does not fit within the Zauderer framework, the second excep-
tion requires the government to "prove that (1) its asserted interest is
substantial, (2) the restriction directly and materially advances that inter-
est, and (3) the restriction is narrowly tailored." 20
In the present case, the majority opinion first addressed the FDA's con-
tention that the Rule should be analyzed under the Zauderer standard.21
While analyzing Supreme Court precedent, the majority explained that
the lenient Zauderer standard only applies if the disclosure is aimed at
"correc[ting] misleading commercial speech." 22 Due to the nature of the
disclosure and the commercial speech, and "the absence of any congres-
sional findings on the misleading nature of cigarette packaging itself," the
majority held that the images did not justify using the Zauderer stan-
dard.23 The majority followed this conclusion by dismissing the dissent's
argument that cigarette packaging that "fail[s] to prominently display the
negative consequences of smoking [is] misleading," arguing that the to-
bacco industries' existing compliance with FDA laws, including the new
textual requirements, provided adequate warning to consumers. 24 The
majority then addressed-and quickly dismissed-the argument put forth
by amicus that the graphic images be evaluated in light of past deception
by the tobacco industry, concluding that the FDA implemented the warn-
ings not to combat deceptive claims but, instead, to discourage consumers
from buying tobacco products.25
The majority further held that the graphic images were not the type of
factual, accurate, and uncontroversial statements that Zauderer requires,
noting that the disclosures upheld in Zauderer and Milavetz "were clear
18. R.J. Reynolds II, 696 F.3d at 1212.
19. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1344 (2010)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 202 (1982)).
20. R.J. Reynolds II, 696 F.3d at 1212 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980)). There appears to be differing views on
whether the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny standard applies in the context of com-
pelled commercial disclosures. See id. at 1217. In the context of commercial disclosures, as
opposed to restrictions on speech, some circuits choose between strict scrutiny and the
Zauderer standard. See, e.g., Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d
509, 554 (6th Cir. 2012). However, in the present case, both the majority opinion and the
dissenting opinion appear to agree that the D.C. Circuit approach is to analyze disclosures
under either the Zauderer standard or the intermediate scrutiny test of Central Hudson.
See R.J. Reynolds II, 696 F.3d at 1217, 1222 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
21. See R.J. Reynolds II, 696 F.3d at 1213-17.
22. Id. at 1213-16 (discussing Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'I Regulation, Bd. of
Accounting, 512 U.S. 136 (1994); Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S.
Ct. 1324 (2010)).
23. Id. at 1214-15.
24. Id. at 1215.
25. Id. at 1215-16.
2013] 365
SMU LAW REVIEW
statements that were both indisputably accurate and not subject to misin-
terpretation by consumers." 26 In coming to this conclusion, the majority
opined that some images chosen by the FDA, like "a man smoking
through a tracheotomy hole," could potentially be misinterpreted by con-
sumers and were primarily intended to "shock [consumers] into retaining
the information in the text warning." 27 The majority then pointed to the
image of a man wearing a T-shirt containing the words "I QUIT," stating
that these and other images were "attempts to evoke emotion" and could
not "rationally be viewed as pure attempts to convey information to
consumers." 28
After determining that the Zauderer standard did not apply, the opin-
ion next analyzed the images under the Central Hudson test.2 9 The major-
ity framed its analysis by stating that "[t]he only explicitly asserted
interest in either the Proposed or Final Rule is an interest in reducing
smoking rates."30 The majority next determined that the studies per-
formed by the FDA of other countries implementing similar graphic
images did not provide "a shred of evidence" that the images directly
advanced this interest, as required by Central Hudson.3' Accordingly, the
majority vacated the image requirements as an unconstitutional infringe-
ment on commercial speech.32
The dissenting opinion vigorously disagreed with this holding. The dis-
sent began by arguing that the images should have been analyzed under
Zauderer scrutiny.33 The dissent disputed the majority's analysis by citing
to the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit for the proposition that the
government need only show the "possibility of deception or a tendency to
mislead" and that where the "'likelihood of deception' is 'hardly a specu-
lative one' the court may rely instead on experience and common
sense." 34 Using this authority, the dissent argued that "[c]ommon sense,
experience, and substantial scientific evidence support the conclusion that
[the existing] warnings are ineffective" and that even absent affirmative
misleading statements, cigarette packaging that does not display the costs
of smoking in a prominent manner is misleading.35 Similarly, the dissent
cited to D.C. Circuit precedent for the proposition that the decades of
26. Id. at 1216.
27. Id. (contending that the "FDA tacitly admit[ed]" this intention, and thus the warn-
ings could not be "'purely' factual").
28. Id. at 1216-17.
29. Id. at 1217.
30. Id. at 1218.
31. Id. at 1219. For purposes of this analysis, the majority assumed that the interest
was substantial. See id. at 1218.
32. Id. at 1222.
33. Id. at 1222-23 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 1227 (quoting Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct.
1324, 1340 (2010); Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Transp., 687 F.3d 403, 413
(D.C. Cir. 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
35. Id. at 1228.
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past tobacco industry deception renders current packaging misleading.36
The dissent further argued that the images, when properly viewed in
light of their accompanying textual warning, disclose factually accurate
information and thus do not infringe on the Companies' First Amend-
ment rights.37 The dissent concluded by arguing that, in light of scientific
literature in the FDA's study, these warnings were "'reasonably related'
to the government's interest in effectively conveying the negative health
consequences of smoking to consumers" and should thus be upheld as
constitutional.38
This case is the first to directly confront the constitutionality of the
final nine images. Although the Sixth Circuit has upheld the Act as con-
stitutional, it noted that its ruling pertained only to the Act as a whole,
and not to the specific images that were presently challenged. 39 The opin-
ion went so far as to explicitly distinguish itself from the district court
case from which the present appeal arose.40 Accordingly, as the graphic
warnings continue to be challenged across the country, the outcome of
the present case will serve as a benchmark for other circuits.
The outcome of this case turned on applying the correct level of scru-
tiny.41 Contrary to the holding, this Note takes the position that Zauderer
is the correct standard and that the proposed images should have been
upheld.42 The majority's position that the Rule is not aimed at deceptive
advertising is rebutted by D.C. Circuit precedent, which recognizes the
tendency of cigarette marketing to mislead consumers in light of past de-
ception by tobacco industry marketing efforts. 43 Furthermore, the ex-
isting warnings have failed to correct these industry-created
misconceptions. 44 The majority noted that disclosures will meet the
Zauderer standard if there is a "'potentially real' . . . danger that an ad-
vertisement will mislead consumers." 45 As D.C. Circuit precedent and the
FDA's exhaustive analysis indicate, the danger that cigarette packaging
will mislead consumers is not merely potentially real-it is in fact real.4 6
Furthermore, the proposed graphic images are the type of factual infor-
36. Id. at 1228-29 (citing Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749, 760 (D.C. Cir.
1977)).
37. Id. at 1232-33.
38. Id. at 1223. Alternatively, the dissent argued that warnings should meet all the
requirements of the Central Hudson test. Id. at 1235.
39. See Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 647 F.3d 509, 567-68 (6th
Cir. 2012); see also R.J. Reynolds II, 696 F.3d at 1211.
40. Disc. Tobacco, 647 F.3d at 568-69.
41. See R.J. Reynolds II, 696 F.3d at 1222 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
42. See id. at 1229.
43. See id. at 1215-16 (majority opinion); United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566
F.3d 1095, 1144-45 (D.C Cir. 2009).
44. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg.
36,628, 36,632-33 (June 22, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141).
45. R.J. Reynolds II, 696 F.3d at 1214 (quoting Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l
Regulation, Bd. of Accounting, 512 U.S. 136, 146 (1994)).
46. See Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d at 1144-45; Required Warnings for Cigarette
Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,632-33.
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mation required by Zauderer.4 7 The Zauderer opinion foreclosed the ar-
gument that graphic images could not be factual information by noting
that "[tihe use of illustrations or pictures in advertisements serves impor-
tant communicative functions . . ., and it may also serve to impart infor-
mation directly." 4 8 Moreover, these images were not imposed by
themselves but were instead chosen to accompany textual warnings. 4 9 As
the dissent observed, when these images are properly viewed with their
accompanying textual warning, they clearly convey factual information.50
Finally, it must be determined whether the disclosure requirements
reasonably relate to the government's interest. The majority asserts that
the only government interest is curtailing smoking.51 Yet, the government
states in the Rule that "the purpose of these required warnings is to com-
municate effectively and graphically the very real, scientifically estab-
lished adverse consequences of smoking" and that "graphic health
warnings effectively increase awareness of the health risks of smoking,
which is the principal purpose of the warnings." 5 2 Accordingly, it must be
determined whether the images were rationally related to communicating
the adverse consequences of smoking, which will in turn combat existing
misconceptions about smoking. As the dissent notes, in light of strong
"salience measures reported in [the FDA's] study, . . . [these images are]
reasonably related to the government's interest in effectively communi-
cating information."5 3
The effect of the majority's holding is to overturn a law that will help
combat a major health concern in the United States. Approximately 47
million U.S. adults smoke cigarettes, as well as 19.5% of children in
grades nine through twelve.54 Although the health consequences of
smoking are devastating, these consequences are not adequately con-
veyed by existing warnings, particularly in light of past industry decep-
tion.5 5 The results of the FDA's research indicate that the chosen images
will help to elucidate these consequences to consumers and possibly have
the effect of lowering the smoking rate.5 6 Given the possibility of these
laudable results, this holding is disconcerting not only in a strictly legal
sense, but in a broader social sense as well.
47. See R.J. Reynolds II, 696 F.3d at 1230, 1233 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
48. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471
U.S. 626, 647 (1985).
49. R.J. Reynolds II, 696 F.3d at 1208 (majority opinion).
50. Id. at 1231 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 1218 (majority opinion).
52. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg.
36,628, 36,641, 36,642 (June 22, 2011) (emphasis added).
53. See R.J. Reynolds II, 696 F.3d at 1233 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (citing Required
Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,638, 36,642,
36,649-57).
54. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. at
36,629.
55. See id. at 36,631-32.
56. See id. at 36,637-41.
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For the aforementioned reasons, the majority opinion applied the im-
proper level of scrutiny in its analysis and incorrectly found the image
requirements unconstitutional. These images and their textual warnings
convey factual information and are reasonably related to conveying the
health risks of smoking, thus combatting the historical deception of the
tobacco industry. Overturning these warning requirements will act to the
detriment of disseminating the negative consequences of smoking and
will thus prevent possible reductions in smoking rates.
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